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A.P. Moeller-Maersk A/S: The shakeup of a leader? 
To separate or not to separate? 
 
It was 24th of September 2016, on an early Saturday morning, in Maersk headquarters planted just 
next to the Baltic sea. A board meeting was appointed to vote on the future of the largest Danish 
conglomerate regarding the difficult times Maersk group had get through since 2015. A group 
known worldwide by the way it defined the course of goods transportation. Though, in Denmark 
it means more than a simple company, it is a matter of national pride. On one hand, Maersk is 
seen as the queen of seas, with links with the Danish Viking routes and its dominance throughout 
the oceans. On the other hand, Maersk has had a broad presence in the Danish economy. Until 
2014 it was a major shareholder, in Denmark's largest Bank, the largest retailer and largest oil 
company.  
The purpose of this early meeting was to perform a review of the business activities of the group, 
taking into account the major challenges posed both in the company’s shipping sector and in 
energy sector.  
In 2016, Maersk was a leader shipping company in the middle of a freight rates price war and a 
series of consolidation moves, largely driven by the aggressive behavior of Cosco, a Chinese 
state-backed company, whose sector had extreme importance for the Chinese Government’s 
strategic objectives. At the same time, the Danish company had a smaller energy (oil and gas) 
division within the group that accounted for 24% of the group’s revenues, still considered to be 
part of the company’s core business. The group composition created a natural hedge. When oil 
price is high, the main cost of operating container ships goes up, but the energy division keeps 
the group a float with an increase of its margins. Conversely, when the oil price goes down, the 
shipping division becomes more profitable.  
In 2015 and 2016, both oil price and freight rates have dropped, thus the hedge was not paying 
off and Maersk group showed in red in 2016. The Board’s opinions were split in half and two 
opposite viewpoints were on the table. The Board members started to consider their alternatives 
and to question which path the company should follow to keep strengthening its leadership 
position and continuing growth perspectives: is the "natural hedge" between shipping and oil 
something that should be retained? Does this combination generate positive synergies or a 
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conglomerate discount? Should the group, in face of the new competitive environment focus on 




A.P. Moeller-Maersk A/S, commonly known as Maersk, is a Danish conglomerate active in the 
container logistics and upstream oil & gas value chains, employing 88 thousand people across 
130 countries.  
Maersk was founded as a shipping company by Peter Mærsk-Møller and his son Arnold Peter 
Møller, in 1904, in Svendborg, a small town on a Danish island. On its foundation the company 
was named Dampskibsselskabet Svendborg. A.P Møller had four children, one of whom was 
Arnold Mærsk McKinney Møller, a long-time figure of Maersk group that served as CEO since 
his father deceased, in 1965 up until 1993. After 1993, he was appointed chairman of the company 
until 2003, when retired completely at the age of ninety. The company remained family-controlled 
through several foundations that in turn control 70% of voting rights and 53% of the capital. The 
company’s share capital is split into 10 million A-shares with two votes per share and 10 million 
B-shares without any voting rights. Both share classes are listed on the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange.   
In 2016 the group had 8 units, separated between shipping and energy divisions. Maersk Line 
(global number one in container shipping), APM Terminals (global top-five container terminal 
operator), Damco (freight forwarder) and Svitzer (tugs and port operations) belong to the energy 
division. Maersk Oil (midsized upstream oil & gas), Maersk Drilling (offshore oil services), 
Maersk Supply Services and Maersk Tankers were part of the energy division (see Exhibit 1). 
Since 2014 Maersk has been divesting its non-core businesses to focus on logistics and oil. In 
2014 the company sold stakes in two large retail chains in Denmark by $3.11 billion, using the 
proceeds to strengthen its Balance sheet. One year later, it exited Denmark’s leading bank, Danske 
Bank, where it was the largest shareholder with a stake of 20%. The proceeds were handed back 
to shareholders through a special dividend in 2015.  
  
Maersk Line 
Maersk Line is the largest operating unit of the group by revenue, representing nearly 60% of the 
total revenues. It provides shipping services through a fleet of 777 container vessels, with a 
capacity of 4,154,305 TEU1, what allows Maersk to have a broad global presence and to be the 
world container shipping leader with a market share of around 19.4% (see Exhibit 2), post 
                                                 
1 The twenty-foot equivalent unit is a unit of cargo capacity often used to describe the capacity of 
container ships and container terminals. It is based on the volume of a 20-foot-long intermodal container. 
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Hamburg Süd acquisition. Maersk Line is not only larger, but its rigorous cost discipline 
consistently yields better returns than its peers (see Exhibit 3). This cost advantage results from 
its large and efficient fleet that yields scale economy benefits. Besides its competitive advantage 
on costs side, Maersk is a first mover among its peers in the digitization of processes and in the 
implementation of technology on its vessels. It has analytics teams that project models to calculate 
the best routes, build sensors to deal with empty containers, stack containers in a more suitable 
way in the ship or develop sensors and models to predict necessary maintenances, instead of just 
waiting that the ship breaks. These changes improved customer experience while decreased costs. 
In 2016, following the consolidation trend of the shipping industry, Maersk announced the 
acquisition of Hamburg Süd, the 7th largest container shipping line and a leader in the North-
South routes, obtaining estimated synergies within the range of $350 to $400 million per year. 
Despite Maersk's cost efficiency, in comparison with its peers, from 2015 onwards Maersk line 
has lived a troubled period. Between 2015 and 2016 top line decreased 25%, while its EBITDA 
margin decreased from 15.4% in 2014 to 7.4% in 2016 (see Exhibit 4). This slump on the business 
performance arises from the pressure on freight rates, Maersk average freight rate decreased 32% 
in two years, partially offset by a 10% increase in volumes. In 2015, it has managed to lower the 
unitary, per TEU cost by 11.5% YoY. However, most of that was due to the lower cost of bunker 
oil2, and unitary overheads excluding bunker oil costs were only down 3.5%. The decrease in 
operational costs did not go further in 2015 since volumes were continuously falling below the 
Management’s expectations. In 2016, Maersk Management continued to focus its efforts on 
lowering the unitary costs. The measures implemented comprised a layoff of 4,000 employees 
and a 10-year vessel sharing agreement with the global number two MSC, that created benefits 
around $350 million per year.  
For the future, the company is focused on decreasing its unitary costs to maintain the cost 
leadership among its peers, while eyeing inorganic growth opportunities in a market in 
consolidation.  
 
APM Terminals  
APM Terminals is an international container terminal operator. It is the second largest port and 
terminal operator in the world, by capacity, and is the largest port and terminal company in terms 
of geographic reach. It operates 189 port and terminal facilities in 61 countries worldwide and 
has been decreasing the dependence on Maersk line, generating 67.5% (see Exhibit 4) of its sales 
from other container shipping firms. The terminals and ports business generate 11.5% of Maersk 
revenues, an activity that has been gaining importance over the recent past. With contracts on 
                                                 
2 Bunker oil is the name given to any fuel used to power ships. Cargo ships typically burn the heavy, 
residual oil left over after gasoline, diesel and other light hydrocarbons are extracted from crude oil 
during the refining process. 
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some of the world main ports, like Port of Rotterdam and Pier 400 Los Angeles, the largest 
gateway port in USA, are managed by APM Terminals. Five out of ten of the busiest ports in the 
world have presence of APM Terminals.  
Since 2014, APMT faces several challenges due to its exposure to Russia and West Africa 
regions. The Russian embargo on the import of products from EU, US and Australia affected the 
volumes traded in the region. The low oil price is weakening the African economies and it 
consequently affects the purchase power of countries dependent on imports. These negative 
events along with the shipping industry momentum are pressing the profitability of the APMT 
unit, with an EBITDA margin of 18.3%, 4.4% less than in 2014. 
In terms of the global market, container terminal operators are faced with weaker demand growth 
caused by a slowdown of trade, rise of operating and capital costs due to larger vessels and the 
recent consolidation taking place in the shipping industry is shifting bargaining power with 
customers away from terminals, putting pressure on rates. So a natural response to the market 
challenges is to consolidate terminal ownership in parallel to the liner alliances and construct 
more efficient ports to accommodate the new vessels and enhance the transshipment process. The 
APM Terminal in Rotterdam is considered a state-of-the-art within the industry. It is known as 
“ghost terminal” for running its operations with almost no human intervention. Each crane moves 
10 more containers per hour than its competitors.  
The expansion of the Panama channel on June 26th 2017, by allowing wider ships to cross through 
it, is also posing some challenges on the world routes that may be adjusted in the future and move 
traffic away of some APM Ports. Another threat is posed by the opening of new arctic routes 




Damco provides multiple logistic services mostly divided into freight forwarding and supply and 
chain management to companies that need to move goods from one point to another. Selling 
efficient solutions to enable customers to cut their inventories and reducing operating costs, 
Damco is the world’s tenth largest ocean freight forwarder by volume and twentieth in the air 
freight market. The unit has a presence in more than 100 countries through more than 300 offices 
and manages 2.9 million TEU of ocean freights and supply chain management services. Despite 
its little contribute to Maersk group revenues and profits, only 7.1% (see Exhibit 4), Damco 
performs an important role within the group, since its supply and chain solutions tend to buildup 
synergies within the logistics unit. Bigger synergies are somehow limited by a chinese wall 
between Damco and Maersk Line in the better interest of its customers. However there is always 
scope to growth by cross-selling to Maersk Line clients, considering only 12% of Maersk Line 
volume is sold along with an inland service. 
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Svitzer is a leading towage operator with 130 operations globally. It performs harbor towage, 
LNG, oil, mining terminal towage and salvage services with a fleet of over 400 tugs, line handlers 
and other vessels. The contribution of the company to the group sales volume it is only around 
1.8% (see Exhibit 4).  
 
Maersk oil  
Maersk Oil and Gas A/S operates in the upstream segment of the of the oil and gas industry. It 
has operations in the Danish and the UK sections of the North Sea, the US Gulf of Mexico, Qatar, 
Algeria and Kazakhstan. With the low oil price, the company is focused on the operational 
efficiency, from 2014 to 2016 it reduced its exploration costs in 47% and other operational costs 
in 36%. In 2016, its breakeven price per oil barrel was set on $40. From 2017 onwards it is 
expected to be within the range $40-$45. This increment on the breakeven price due to the contract 
expiration in Qatar by the end of the 1st half of 2017. The termination of this contract will lead 
Maersk oil to a decrease of importance within the group, accounting for less than 10% of the 
earnings. From 2016 onwards, Maersk oil has been solidifying its position as a North Sea operator 
with international step-outs. Maersk oil is the main energy unit of the group, with revenues of 
$4.8 billion (see Exhibit 5) and contracts several services to the other energy related companies 
of the group. Maersk oil generates 95% of its revenues on the oil exploration, with natural gas 
making up only 5% of the total. However, in 2019 the Culzean gas field contract will come into 
effect and therefore the company will be able to increase the weight of natural gas towards 25%. 
This is a clear disadvantage, given the bearish outlook of the natural gas prices, driven by 
increasing exploration of shale gas in the US.   
 
Maersk drilling  
Maersk Drilling A/S is an oil service company that provides offshore drilling services and land-
rig operations to oil and gas production companies around the world. Maersk Drilling is the 11th 
largest player in the industry and the first to operate in the North Sea, where the safety standards 
of exploration are the strictest of the industry. The company operates a fleet of harsh environment 
jack-up rigs, ultra-deepwater drill ships, and deepwater semi-submersible rigs. The average age 
of its floating rigs is six years, which compares to an industry average (according to company’s 
own analysis) of 16 years, while its jack up fleet is an average of ten years old compared to an 
industry average of 22 years old. This becomes particularly important in the market of floating 
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rigs regarding the disparities in utilization rates between the rigs built after the year of 2000 and 
the ones assembled earlier to that date. According to company’s research, older floating rig 
utilization registered was about 40% at the end of 2016 whereas the one registered for younger 
rigs was 60%.   
The company is sailing on an industry storm.  According to the company’s 2015 annual report: 
“The offshore contract drilling is in the middle of the worst downturn in the history of the 
industry”. Nevertheless, Maersk drilling was the most profitable unit (excluding one off 
impairments) among the energy division (see Exhibit 5), either in 2015 and 2016. This can be 
attributed to the length of drill contracts that were signed on a period where the margins of the 
industry were higher, consequence of higher oil prices. Despite the positive short term 
perspectives laid on a comfortable contract book, there is some uncertainty regarding the 
renovation of the contracts as the industry is directly linked to the oil momentum and does not 
show recovery prospects in the near term.  
 
Maersk Supply Service 
Maersk Supply Service A/S provides offshore marine services to oil and gas companies in Europe, 
Asia Pacific, Africa and North America. Its services include moving offshore structures, such as 
drilling rigs and barges, support from offshore crane vessels, subsea infrastructure assistance, 
transportation of equipment to and from rigs and production units and installation and preset of 
heavy mooring systems. In the near future the company is focused on offering integrated solution 
portfolio for customers, while being able to increase the synergies within the services provided. 
The current challenges of the company are the oversupply and the lower offshore spending, given 
the oil industry weak outlook. 
 
Maersk Tankers 
Maersk Tankers A/S owns and operates a fleet of tankers, that transport energy products. It has 
the fourth largest product tanker fleet and it is one of the youngest in the industry. At the end of 
2016 it operated a portfolio of 158 vessels of which 84 were owned, 22 chartered and 52 operated 
for third parties under commercial management. The company transports energy products, such 
as refined oil products through its vessel fleet. The financial performance of the company had a 
turnaround in 2014, after the company divested the gas and oil operation to focus solely on 
products3. In 2013, it sold the last LPG4 carrier and in 2014 the company divested the fleet of 
                                                 
3 Oil Tankers comprise Crude tankers and Product Tankers. Crude Tankers are specifically used to 
transport crude oil from the exploration site to the crude oil refining industrial plant. Product tankers 
transport oil based derivatives, like petrol, gasoline, kerosene and paraffin. 
4 LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas. 
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VLCCs5. At the same time, it implemented a cost cutting plan that aimed to reduce operational 
expenses by 12% between 2014 and 2019. In 2016 $30m of cost savings were realized. In order 
to achieve a low cost structure, it has entered into an equity agreement with U.S. hedge fund 
CargoMetrics, granting access to analytical models and algorithms to better manage the risk of 




Transports & Logistics 
The shipping industry, and specially the containers, is considered a key driver for the globalization 
phenomenon occurred over the past decades. Before containers being invented in 1956 by 
Malcom McLean, the trans boarding of cargo was so slow, implying ships usually spent more 
time on docks than they did at sea. 
After this invention, shipping lived its Golden Era alongside the growth of multinationals 
companies and supported by the rise of the emerging countries that changed the goods production 
cycle. The offshoring of production sites from the developed economies to cheap labor 
economies, fueled the expansion of the global logistic infrastructure and shipping. However, after 
those rosy times, the industry hit the bottom in 2015/2016 (see Exhibit 6).  
The shipping industry is divided into three segments, oil and gas, bulk commodities and 
containers. The containers shipping represents around 60% of all seaborne trade. 
The problem of shipping lines is transverse to all segments, too many vessels ordered and few 
ones scrapped (see Exhibit 7), while the global trade decelerated. Since the financial crisis, the 
economic growth was weak and the manufacturing patterns also changed. Volkswagen does not 
build its cars in Wolfsburg to ship to China or Brazil, but started building factories on the local 
markets. Other reasons supporting the market disequilibrium involve the time length of 
constructing a vessel and the over-confidence of the shipping companies. The transporters place 
orders when the industry is booming and rates are going up. Nonetheless, since it takes 
approximately two years to build a vessel, by the time it is delivered, the economic cycle might 
be different. Additionally, due to the overall industry bullish sentiment the number of orders for 
competitors increase during the boom. Thus, most of the ships start operating at the same time, 
creating overcapacity and consequently crush the freight rates.  
The year of 2016 marks the lowest point of the shipping industry, according to  Guggenheim 
Shipping ETF (see Exhibit 6), an index that covers the main worldwide shipping companies. The 
industry has been pressed on both supply and demand sides since the financial crisis. The first 
                                                 
5 VLCCs – Very Large Crude Carriers, also known as Supertankers, are the largest operating cargo 
vessels in the world. With a size in excess of 250 thousand Dead Weight Tonnage. 
A.P. Moeller-Maersk A/S: The shakeup of a leader? 
 
 8 
causality of the disequilibria was the bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping of South Korea, formerly the 
world’s seventh-largest line. At the time of the default, among the 12 largest container lines, 11 
registered losses. Even Maersk line, which has the lowest unitary costs in the industry, lost $367m 
in 2016. Overall, container lines lost $10 billion in 2016 on revenues of $170 billion, given the 
pressure on prices. In 2011 it cost $961 to send a 20-foot box from New York to Rotterdam, in 
2016 it cost $252 (see Exhibit 8). The overcapacity problem backs to 2011. In the aftermath of 
the financial crisis and after a cooling period of the world growth and trade, Maersk Line defined 
cost cuttings as the main priority on the years after. In a maneuver to cut costs, Maersk ordered 
20 huge Triple-E (Economy of scale, Energy Efficient and Environmentally improved) class 
vessels. This move incentivized its rivals to order new and bigger vessels, to compete in costs 
with Maersk. In a first phase, the industry used a method called “slow-steaming”, that consisted 
in reducing the sail speed to mask the extra supply. However, at certain point the reduction of the 
sail speed could not absorb all this extra-supply. Moreover the decrease in oil prices leads slow-
steaming returns to be lower. This yields the risk that vessels could speed up again and degrade 
the freight rates even further. 
The bigger lines kept pressing margins down by ordering super-size ships and this way losing 
money, in the hope their new fuel-efficient vessels would push weaker competitors out-of-
business and small and independent owners to scrap older vessels. However, it takes time to drive 
out enough smaller players to rebalance the market. An easier and faster solution would be scrap 
older ships. Higher scrap rates, will directly impact the overcapacity of the sector and freight-
rates would break-even.  
Nevertheless, there are two main causes for smaller ship-owners not scrapping their vessels, on 
a time of low rates. First, there is an overproduction of steel6 by China and the scrap value per 
long ton of ship fell by half, since 2014. The low price of iron (see Exhibit 9) makes the scrap 
value substantially lower than the cost of new ones. The other reason is that companies took on 
too much debt in the past. Furthermore, if they scrap unprofitable vessels, companies have to 
write-down a significant amount of assets off their balance sheets and would end up wiping out 
their equity book values and breach debt covenants.  
 
Industry Consolidation  
February 2016 was marked by the launching of Cosco Shipping, headquartered in Shanghai. The 
new company was the result of an $8.7 billion merger between the two Chinese biggest lines, 
China Ocean Shipping and China Shipping Group. Both were state-owned and were losing money 
before the current downturn. Then, the Chinese government that believes in the importance of 
                                                 
6 Steel is a mixture of iron and carbon and is directly linked to the steel price 
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this sector for China’s long-term interests, subsidised the companies and merged both to create a 
stronger global player.  
Then, in October, three Japanese container lines Nippon Yusen KK, Mitsui O.S.K and Kawasi 
Kisen Kaisha announced a merger of equals, under a new company named Ocean Network 
Express (ONE). It’s total capacity is about 1.27 million TEUs, making it the world’s six largest 
container line and controlling about 5,9%% of the market, still less than half the size of the two 
largest companies, Maersk and MSC. The deal is expected to save $963 million a year through 
synergies, a significant value given that Nippon Yusen and Kawasaki Kisen posted, in 2015, net 
losses of $2.31bn and $1.22bn. 
In December 2015, CMA CGM, the third largest shipping container, announced the takeover of 
Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) for $5 billion, including debt. The strategic acquisition results in a 
combined turnover of $22bn, a market share of approximately 11.7% and a capacity of 2.5 million 
TEUs through 563 vessels. The main drivers of the deal were the companies’ lack of overlap, 
allowing CMA to grow on routes where it had a weak service and NOL finished a fleet 
modernisation program worth $4bn in 2014, therefore it is, also, a way to renew CMA fleet. 
The German giant Hapag-Lloyd participated in two deals that changed its wholly ownership 
structure. First, in 2014 the company announced an all-stock takeover of Chile’s Cia. Sud 
Americana de Vapores SA, CSAV. The transaction created a company with a combined revenue 
of $9 billion, a fleet of about 200 ships and total transport capacity of about 1 million TEU. Annual 
savings of at least $300 million are anticipated simply as a result of network optimizations, 
improvements to productivity and reductions in costs. “The combination with CSAV, Latin 
America’s leading container shipping line, considerably strengthens Hapag-Lloyd in this growth 
market and adds a strong position in the North-South traffic to the company’s global network and 
to its established strength in East-West traffics”, said Oscar Hasbún7 CSAV CEO. 
In 2015, Hapag-Lloyd and United Arab Shipping Company, UASC also pushed through further 
consolidation when a merger between the two was announced. This deal is expected to create 
synergies of $435m with a significant portion realized in 2018 and the full amount achieved in 
the year after. The two companies’ combined will operate 230 vessels and a shared fleet capacity 
of 1.5 million TEU.  
In December of 2016, Maersk Line acquired Hamburg Sud, the 7th largest container carrier, by 
$4.02 billion. The acquisition is expected to generate between $350 million and $400 million of 
annual savings. The deal also helps Maersk to consolidate its leadership as Hamburg Sud is widely 
considered to be the leader in the North-South trades. 
 
 
                                                 
7 From Hapag-Lloyd deal announcement  
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The consolidation is not only happening through mergers & acquisitions, but also by alliances 
between the major players. Carrier alliances are vessel-sharing agreements. Carriers within an 
alliance pool together their fleets of ships, moving containers on one another’s’ behalf to extend 
their service offerings and geographic coverage, however always keeping the relation with the 
customer out of the alliance scope. No carrier can afford to buy and operate the number of vessels 
needed to offer weekly sailings across every port they serve. Alliances let carriers offer more 
sailings with fewer vessels. 
The three alliances, which comprise 11 shipping operators, will handle much of the container 
trade on the Asia-to-Europe and trans-Pacific routes. 
2M 
In July 2014, Maersk signed a 10-year Vessel Sharing Agreement (VSA) with MSC on the Asia-
Europe, Transatlantic and Transpacific trades. The VSA is referred as 2M, and replaced all 
existing VSAs and slot purchase agreements that both Maersk line and MSC have in these trades. 
This VSA will include 185 vessels with an estimated capacity of 5.7 million TEU, sharing port 
rotations for 21 services. 
Ocean Alliance 
The Ocean Alliance brings together, CMA, Cosco, Evergreen and OOCL, respectively, the 
world’s 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 9th largest container lines and it is seen as a direct attempt to 
counterbalance the dominance of the 2M alliance in the market. This follows CMA’s recent 
takeover of Neptune Orient Lines and the consolidation of its APL, USL, and ANL brands, as 
well as COSCO’s giant merger with China Shipping. This alliance will, also be subject to a 10-
year agreement, including 323 vessels and sharing port rotations for 40 services. The agreement 
covers 3 routes: Asia-North America, Asia North-Europe and Asia-Mediterranean. 
THE Alliance 
THE is another alliance marked by the industry’s recent moves towards greater consolidation. 
The members are Hapag-Lloyd, Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, NYK 
Line and K line.  
The alliance covers 31 services, with 240 vessels for the routes: Asia/Europe, North Atlantic and 
Trans-Pacific, including the Middle East and Arabian Gulf/Red Sea. 
After all the deals and VSAs the top five container-shipping companies now account for 61% 
(accounting for mergers) of market capacity. And the three alliances control more than 75% of 
total capacity.  
Regarding the consolidation path the industry is following, allied to larger ships and bigger ports, 
the transportation costs fall, bringing benefits for customers all over the place. The industry needs 
to step into further consolidation, in order to giant shipping lines lock up the rates. Regulators are 
already worried about the impact on competition. In 2014, Chinese authorities vetoed a plan to a 
larger alliance between Maersk, MSC and CMA, that would have joined the three world largest 
A.P. Moeller-Maersk A/S: The shakeup of a leader? 
 
 11 
operators. Now, the 2M alliance, between Maersk line and MSC, controls 28% of the world 
container trade. The rationale behind the alliances is sharing space on their ships on transatlantic 
and transpacific routes.  
 
Oil & gas 
 
The dramatic fall in the price of oil from over $100 a barrel in the middle of 2014 to $27.67 a 
barrel in January 2016 (see Exhibit 10) was caused by several factors. In a nutshell, too much 
supply and two little demand. On the demand side, China’s economic slowdown curbed the 
demand for commodities in general. While, on the supply side the rise of US shale oil producers 
increased the oil output. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, the largest world oil producer did not cut its 
production in a try to keep its market share and to push high cost producers out of the market. 
This slump on oil prices hit hard higher cost producers, such as the North Sea producers.  
During the era of a $100 oil barrel, the sector prioritized growth rather than efficiency. After the 
fall on oil prices, the players had to enter in cost cutting programs, efficiency measures, layoffs 
and asset divestments in order to slim operating costs. The weak oil price forced companies to 
focus on their cost base and cash flow break-even prices. The ability to assume project economic 
risk has dramatically narrowed, evidenced by project delays or cancellations, with companies 
only approving the most resilient to stress situations. According to Mckinsey8 the demand for 
global energy will continue to grow, though at an average of about 0.7% per year through 2015, 
versus an average of more than 2% from 2000 to 2015. During the same period, oil demand 
growth will flatten at 0.4% and 70% of this growth will be driven by petrochemical industries. 
All growth in energy demand will be driven by developing economies while in North America 
and Europe the demand will decline. In the foreseeable future, this demand slowdown is 
attributable to a growth in digitization processes, slowdown of population and economic growth, 
greater efficiency in oil consumer equipment’s and the global economic shift toward services. 
These use less energy than manufacturing. For example, in India the weight of services activities 
in GDP is expected to rise from 54% to 64% by 2035. By 2035, Mckinsey research believes that 
will take less 40% fuel to propel a fossil-fueled car a mile than it does now. By 2050 global 
“energy intensity” (How much energy is used to produce each unit of GDP) will be half what it 
was in 2013. The global energy intensity improved almost by a third since 1990 to 2015, and this 
rate of progress is expected to accelerate. 
By 2050, electricity will account for 25% of all energy demand, compared with 18% now. A third 
of global power generation will come from nonhydro renewable sources.  Concluding the oil & 
                                                 
8 Mckinsey Global Institute (2016). Global Energy Perspective to 2050 
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gas sector is expected to decrease its importance as economies become less reliant on these energy 
sources, what will undoubtedly affect its prices. 
 
Valuation 
The board decision will be, in great part, determined by the valuation of the conglomerate. The 
valuation is somewhat complicated due to the absence of a perfect peer to compare with it. So the 
board resorted in relative valuation to produce a valuation range. First, the board was confident 
that Maersk as a group would be able to get back to covering capital costs employed a multiples 
approach focused on returns prospects, assuming an EV / IC of 1x when proper peers were not 
available (Svitzer and Maersk Supply Services). Second, Maersk is a conglomerate and as such 
the board considers a sum-of-the-parts (SOTP) approach to be the most appropriate way of 
valuing the group. The SOTP was conducted through a peer multiple valuation (see Exhibit 12) 




The board was about to decide on the future of the Maersk conglomerate and clearly there were 
two opposite factions within it. One party was in favor of divesting the energy division, claiming 
there was a conglomerate discount to unwind while focusing on the T&L division in order to keep 
its leadership within the container shipping industry.  The pros invoked consisted of reinvesting 
the proceeds in the company’s consolidation, either  through organic growth - investing in the 
digitization of the companies, buying more efficient vessels and build new advanced terminal 
facilities - or by inorganic growth and take a part in the consolidation process of the industry, 
always maintaining a solid financial position. Another advantage pointed to the divestment of the 
energy unit was the weak outlook of the oil & gas market, with excess supply and no signs of an 
increase in demand with several green solutions being feasible during a period of cheap oil. Since 
both divisions operate in capital intensive industries, those in favor of the separation consider that 
a split would create lighter and more focused structures. An additional reason pointed was the 
competition for capital between divisions. The split would allow Maersk Line and APM 
Terminals to play a major role in the consolidation of their industries while being able to keep its 
leadership. On the energy side, Maersk Oil is a major oil player in the North Sea and therefore it 
can refocus its portfolio to this region and strengthens its portfolio through assets acquisitions on 
this area. 
The opposite party was in favor of keeping the energy division inward the group scope, alleging 
that the natural hedge between divisions gives Maersk a competitive advantage with a better 
stability of cash flows and an investment grade credit rating. 
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The board was about to decide on the future of Maersk as a conglomerate. The most important 
questions to be answered were: Challenges posed by the containers’ industry moment? The pros 
and cons of a separation? How would be conducted the divestment? Partially or Total? Through 
a Trade Sale, an IPO, an Asset Sale or a Dividend Stock? Was Maersk trading at a conglomerate 
Discount? Historically Maersk is a conglomerate, why would the conglomerate discount, only, 
trigger a separation in 2016?  
 
Suddenly, a Saturday morning in Copenhagen turned out to be crucial to the future of a legacy 


























A.P. Moeller-Maersk A/S: The shakeup of a leader? 
 
 14 







Source: Company Annual Report 2016 
 








         































57% 7% 13%12% 6% 1%2% 2%
22%78%
Rank Operator TEU Mkt Share Country Alliances 
1 APM-Maersk 4,154,305 19.4% Denmark 2M
2 Mediterranean Shg Co 3,134,336 14.6% Switzerland 2M
3 CMA CGM Group 2,500,405 11.7% France OCEAN
4 Cosco Shipping Co Ltd 1,818,617 8.5% China OCEAN
5 Hapag-Loyd 1,501,137 7.0% Germany THE Alliance 
6 Evergreen Line 686,310 3.2% Taiwan OCEAN
7 OOCL 586,788 2.7% Hong Kong OCEAN
8 Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp. 575,422 2.7% Taiwan THE Alliance 
9 Mitsui O.S.K Lines 543,755 2.5% Japan THE Alliance 
10 NYK Line 386,645 1.8% Japan THE Alliance 
11 Pacific International Line 386,645 1.8% Singapore -
12 Zim 363,826 1.7% Israel -
13 Hyunday M.M 357,996 1.7% South Korea -
14 K Line 341,354 1.6% Japan THE Alliance 
15 Wan Hai Lines 237,419 1.1% Taiwan -
16 X-Press Feeders Group 146,494 0.7% Singapore -
17 KMTC 127,856 0.6% South Korea -
18 Antong Holdings (QASC) 110,894 0.5% China -
19 SITC 108,031 0.5% Hong Kong -
20 Zhonggu Logistics Corp 96,383 0.4% China -
Total 21,461,671
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Exhibit 4: T&L division per segment 
Source: Company Data  
 
Underlying result Reconciliation Maersk line APM Terminals Damco Svitzer T&L Division 
USD Millions 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016
External revenue 25686 26921 23,410 20,416 2,702 2,740 2,785 2,821 3,212 3,160 2,737 2,507 810 781 638 611 32,410 33,602 29,570 26,355
External Revenue % 98.1% 98.4% 98.7% 98.6% 62.4% 61.5% 65.7% 67.6% 100.0% 99.9% 99.9% 100.0% 97.5% 96.2% 95.4% 95.2% 93.7% 93.9% 94.2% 94.0%
Inter-segment revenue 510 430 319 299 1,630 1,715 1,455 1,355 - 4 3 - 21 31 31 31 2,161 2,180 1,808 1,685
Total revenue 26,196 27,351 23,729 20,715 4,332 4,455 4,240 4,176 3,212 3,164 2,740 2,507 831 812 669 642 34,571 35,782 31,378 28,040
Weight on the Group % 54.5% 56.3% 57.6% 56.9% 9.0% 9.2% 10.3% 11.5% 6.7% 6.5% 6.6% 6.9% 1.7% 1.7% 1.6% 1.8% 71.9% 1 1 1
EBITDA 3313 4,212 3,324 1,525 892 1,010 845 764 (65) (148) 54 70 217 170 190 166 4,357 5,244 4,413 2,525
EBITDA Mg 12.6% 15.4% 14.0% 7.4% 20.6% 22.7% 19.9% 18.3% -2.0% -4.7% 2.0% 2.8% 26.1% 20.9% 28.4% 25.9% 12.6% 14.7% 14.1% 9.0%
Depreciation and amortisation (1,789) (1,870) (1,915) (1,929) (297) (302) (309) (378) (28) (34) (29) (26) (85) (93) (84) (83) (2,199) (2,299) (2,337) (2,416)
Impairment losses (10) - (17) (17) - (27) - (10) (6) (68) - - (6) (358) - (3) (22) (453) (17) (30)
Reversal of impairment losses 19 72 - - - - 14 - - - - 3 - - 19 75 14 -
Gain/loss on sale of non-current assets, etc., net 38 89 40 25 70 374 11 18 2 - 5 - 29 5 5 5 139 468 61 48
Share of profit/loss in joint ventures - - - - 93 (14) 114 101 8 9 10 11 22 23 15 11 123 18 139 123
Share of profit/loss in associated companies - 1 (1) - 68 93 85 92 - - - - - - - 1 68 94 84 93
Profit/loss before financial items (EBIT) 1,571 2,504 1,431 (396) 826 1,134 760 587 (89) (241) 40 55 177 (250) 126 97 2,485 3,147 2,357 343
EBIT Mg 6.0% 9.2% 6.0% -1.9% 19.1% 25.5% 17.9% 14.1% -2.8% -7.6% 1.5% 2.2% 21.3% -30.8% 18.8% 15.1% 7.2% 8.8% 7.5% 1.2%
Tax (61) (163) (128) 20 (56) (234) (106) (149) (22) (52) (21) (24) (21) (20) (6) (6) (160) (469) (261) (159)
Net operating profit/loss after tax (NOPAT) 1,510 2,341 1,303 (376) 770 900 654 438 (111) (293) 19 31 156 (270) 120 91 2,325 2,678 2,096 184
NOPAT Mg 5.8% 8.6% 5.5% -1.8% 17.8% 20.2% 15.4% 10.5% -3.5% -9.3% 0.7% 1.2% 18.8% -33.3% 17.9% 14.2% 6.7% 7.5% 6.7% 0.7%
NOPAT Mg (excluding Impairment Losses) 5.6% 8.0% 5.4% -1.9% 16.2% 12.4% 14.8% 10.3% -3.3% -7.1% 0.5% 1.2% 16.0% 9.9% 17.2% 13.9% 6.3% 7.2% 6.5% 0.6%
Underlying result  1,287 (384) 626 433 15 31 116 89
Cash flow from operating activities 3,732 4,119 3,271 1,060 923 925 874 819 (14) (201) 127 4 180 203 138 144 4,821 5,046 4,410 2,027
Cash flow used for capital expenditure (1,607) (1,974) (2,143) (586) (841) 2 (774) (1,549) (23) (45) 6 (8) (2) (235) (152) (192) (2,473) (2,252) (3,063) (2,335)
Free cash flow 2,125 2,145 1,128 474 82 927 100 (730) (37) (246) 133 (4) 178 (32) (14) (48) 2,348 2,794 1,347 (308)
Investments in non-current assets 1 1,729 2,186 2,260 1,892 903 912 845 2,402 29 26 10 9 81 213 197 215 2,742 3,337 3,312 4,518
Intangible assets 1 1 1 - 1,098 1,156 1,350 2,627 193 117 103 90 367 15 16 17 1,659 1,289 1,470 2,734
Property, plant and equipment 21,421 21,693 21,845 21,596 2812 2,862 2,976 3,470 90 87 76 70 969 1,008 1,015 1,094 25,292 25,650 25,912 26,230
Investments in joint ventures - - - - 1708 1,476 1,476 1,479 29 28 26 27 66 65 84 82 1,803 1,569 1,586 1,588
Investments in associated companies 2 1 1 - 492 504 541 641 - - - - - - - 14 494 505 542 655
Other non-current assets 111 161 239 189 188 137 130 198 46 38 32 30 43 54 56 57 388 390 457 474
Assets held for sale - 13 50 2 189 58 12 70 5 6 - - - - - 3 194 77 62 75
Other current assets 2,951 2,726 2,721 3,247 845 800 731 872 798 738 515 500 193 136 131 126 4,787 4,400 4,098 4,745
Total assets 24,486 24,595 24,857 25,034 7,332 6,993 7,216 9,357 1,161 1,014 752 717 1,638 1,278 1,302 1,393 34,617 33,880 34,127 36,501
Non-interest-bearing liabilities (4,440) (4,511) (4,803) (4,952) (1,155) (1,060) (1,039) (1,390) (749) (693) (549) (485) (275) (209) (170) (190) (6,619) (6,473) (6,561) (7,017)
Invested capital, net 20,046 20,084 20,054 20,082 6,177 5,933 6,177 7,967 412 321 203 232 1,363 1,069 1,132 1,203 27,998 27,407 27,566 29,484
A.P. Moeller-Maersk A/S: The shakeup of a leader? 
 
 17 
Exhibit 5: Energy division per segment 
Underlying result Reconciliation Maersk Oil Maersk Drilling Maersk Supply Service Maersk Tankers Energy Division
USD Millions 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016
External revenue 9,142 8,737 5,639 4,718 1,972 2,092 2,486 2,222 764 764 603 374 1,624 1,174 1,055 875 13,502 12,767 9,783 8,189
External Revenue % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98.1% 100.0% 99.5% 98.8% 96.7% 99.0% 98.2% 98.4% 96.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.7% 99.8% 99.9% 99.8% 99.6% 97.9%
Inter-segment revenue - - - 90 - 10 31 75 8 14 10 12 1 1 3 2 9 25 44 179
Total revenue 9,142 8,737 5,639 4,808 1,972 2,102 2,517 2,297 772 778 613 386 1,625 1,175 1,058 877 13,511 12,792 9,827 8,368
Weight on the Group % 19.0% 18.0% 13.7% 13.2% 4.1% 4.3% 6.1% 6.3% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.1% 3.4% 2.4% 2.6% 2.4% 28.1% 0 0 0
EBITDA 5760 5,116 2,748 2,600 863 903 1,396 1,390 349 348 268 104 21 271 297 199 6,993 6,638 4,709 4,293
EBITDA Mg 63.0% 58.6% 48.7% 54.1% 43.8% 43.0% 55.5% 60.5% 45.2% 44.7% 43.7% 26.9% 1.3% 23.1% 28.1% 22.7% 51.8% 51.9% 47.9% 51.3%
Depreciation and amortisation -1570 (1,441) (1,593) (1,175) -239 (313) (519) (589) (146) (142) (141) (136) -195 (132) (140) (139) (2,150) (2,028) (2,393) (2,039)
Impairment losses (98) (2,209) (3,131) (3) - (35) (27) (1,510) - - - (1,219) (230) (4) (1) - (328) (2,248) (3,159) (2,732)
Reversal of impairment losses - 1 - - - - - - - 77 - - 77 1 - -
Gain/loss on sale of non-current assets, etc., net - 4 5 (14) 4 82 46 (1) 5 12 30 (1) 8 (4) 5 4 17 94 86 (12)
Share of profit/loss in joint ventures - - - - 19 (36) 18 19 (1) 1 - - - - - - 18 (35) 18 19
Share of profit/loss in associated companies (42) (5) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (42) (5) - -
Profit/loss before financial items (EBIT) 4,050 1,466 (1,971) 1,408 647 601 914 (691) 207 219 157 (1,252) (319) 131 161 64 4,585 2,417 (739) (471)
EBIT Mg 15.5% 5.4% -8.3% 6.8% 14.9% 13.5% 21.6% -16.5% 6.4% 6.9% 5.7% -49.9% -38.4% 16.1% 24.1% 10.0% 13.3% 6.8% -2.4% -1.7%
Tax (3,004) -2327 (175) (931) (119) (123) (163) (3) (20) (18) (10) 24 2 1 (1) (2) (3,141) (2,467) (349) (912)
Net operating profit/loss after tax (NOPAT) 1,046 (861) (2,146) 477 528 478 751 (694) 187 201 147 (1,228) (317) 132 160 62 1,444 (50) (1,088) (1,383)
NOPAT Mg 4.0% -3.1% -9.0% 2.3% 12.2% 10.7% 17.7% -16.6% 5.8% 6.4% 5.4% -49.0% -38.1% 16.3% 23.9% 9.7% 4.2% -0.1% -3.5% -4.9%
NOPAT Mg (excluding Impairment Losses) 4.4% 4.9% 4.1% 2.4% 12.1% 9.7% 17.3% 19.6% 5.7% 6.0% 4.3% -0.3% -20.7% 17.2% 23.3% 9.0% 4.9% 5.9% 6.3% 4.9%
Underlying result 435 497 732 743 117 (44) 156 58
Cash flow from operating activities 3,246 2,594 1,768 1,484 775 701 1,283 1,345 360 356 250 81 223 232 291 180 4,604 3,883 3,592 3,090
Cash flow used for capital expenditure (1,800) (2,198) (2,017) (1,675) (1,517) (2,160) (854) (315) (81) (188) (206) (103) 748 650 (185) (190) (2,650) (3,896) (3,262) (2,283)
Free cash flow 1,446 396 (249) (191) (742) (1,459) 429 1,030 279 168 44 (22) 971 882 106 (10) 1,954 (13) 330 807
Investments in non-current assets 1 2,414 3,010 2,436 1,511 1,489 2,400 887 296 93 203 276 125 19 204 450 231 4,015 5,817 4,049 2,163
Intangible assets 3,096 1,482 394 760 19 35 37 109 6 9 19 6 5 2 2 5 3,126 1,528 452 880
Property, plant and equipment 6,548 7,525 6,308 6,221 5,459 7,463 7,802 5,925 1727 1,734 1,802 891 1440 1,448 1,645 1,725 15,174 18,170 17,557 14,762
Investments in joint ventures - - - - 159 118 136 155 - - - - 4 1 - 1 163 119 136 156
Investments in associated companies 197 - - - - - - - - - - - 5 1 - - 202 1 - -
Other non-current assets 603 600 960 742 66 33 22 16 4 3 6 - - - - - 673 636 988 758
Assets held for sale - - 20 - - - - - - 16 - - 980 180 41 10 980 196 61 10
Other current assets 1,500 1,185 999 912 516 687 693 535 192 179 133 109 381 185 154 156 2,589 2,236 1,979 1,712
Total assets 11,944 10,792 8,681 8,635 6,219 8,336 8,690 6,740 1,929 1,941 1,960 1,006 2,815 1,817 1,842 1,897 22,907 22,886 21,173 18,278
Non-interest-bearing liabilities (5,466) (5,510) (5,231) (4,546) (899) (713) (712) (476) (230) (237) (191) (424) (480) (234) (198) (176) (7,075) (6,694) (6,332) (5,622)





















Exhibit 7: Global Containerships Fleet Analysis 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Exhibit 8: Freight Rates 
Source: World Container Index assessed by Drewery 
Guggenheim Shipping ETF* (SEA) seeks investment results that correspond generally to the performance, 
before the fund’s fees and expenses, of the Dow Jones Global Shipping Index
SM
.  The Dow Jones Global 
Shipping Index SM seeks to measure the stock performance of high dividend-paying companies in the global 
shipping industry - primarily those that transport goods and materials. The index is weighted by float-






2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Guggenheim Shipping ETF - Sea us Equity
Description Ticker 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Containerships (DWT k) VESLCTDW Index110,746.7 126,350.5 142,435.3 159,564.0 164,733.5 181,248.1 194,051.3 204,127.1 214,544.8 226,473.3 243,889.5 244,170.5
Δ% YoY 14.1% 12.7% 12.0% 3.2% 10.0% 7.1% 5.2% 5.1% 5.6% 7.7% 0.1%
Number of Containerships in Service (# vessels) VESLCTIS Index 3,337.0 3,659.0 4,029.0 4,407.0 4,420.0 4,641.0 4,770.0 4,807.0 4,798.0 4,845.0 4,982.0 4,889.0
Δ% YoY 9.6% 10.1% 9.4% 0.3% 5.0% 2.8% 0.8% -0.2% 1.0% 2.8% -1.9%
Number of Containerships on Order VESLCTOO Index 900.0 918.0 1,203.0 1,028.0 659.0 472.0 517.0 371.0 385.0 318.0 403.0 225.0
Δ% YoY 2.0% 31.0% -14.5% -35.9% -28.4% 9.5% -28.2% 3.8% -17.4% 26.7% -44.2%
Number of Containerships under Construction VESLCTUC Index 140.0 173.0 170.0 143.0 145.0 84.0 65.0 99.0 82.0 98.0 91.0 168.0
Δ% YoY 23.6% -1.7% -15.9% 1.4% -42.1% -22.6% 52.3% -17.2% 19.5% -7.1% 84.6%
Containerships Orderbook 1,040 1,091 1,373 1,171 804 556 582 470 467 416 494 393
Δ% YoY 4.9% 25.8% -14.7% -31.3% -30.8% 4.7% -19.2% -0.6% -10.9% 18.8% -20.4%
Containerships Orderbook as a % of DWT VESLCTPC Index 46% 43% 57% 47% 37% 26% 27% 21% 20% 17% 18% 15%
Description Ticker 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Container Rates (USD per TEU)
Drewry Hong Kong-Los Angeles Container Rate DRCRRATE Index 827 1,146 1,035 974 750 611
Δ% YoY 38.6% -9.7% -5.9% -23.0% -18.6%
    Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants
    
WCI Freight Rate Composite WCIDCOMP Index 754 1,088 951 1,012 688 596
Δ% YoY 44.3% -12.6% 6.5% -32.0% -13.3%
WCI Shanghai to Rotterdam Container Rate WCIDSHRO Index 650 1,325 1,041 1,169 583 653
Δ% YoY 103.8% -21.5% 12.3% -50.1% 12.0%
WCI Rotterdam to Shanghai Container Rate WCIDROSH Index 331 405 468 415 374 311
Δ% YoY 22.4% 15.4% -11.2% -10.0% -16.8%
WCI Shanghai to Genoa Container Rate WCIDSHGE Index 887 1,288 1,089 1,361 692 643
Δ% YoY 45.3% -15.5% 25.1% -49.2% -7.0%
WCI Shanghai to Los Angeles Container Rate WCIDSHLA Index 795 1,131 1,000 975 751 651
Δ% YoY 42.2% -11.6% -2.5% -23.0% -13.3%
WCI Los Angeles to Shanghai Container Rate WCIDLASH Index 407 426 434 360 329 222
Δ% YoY 4.6% 2.0% -17.1% -8.6% -32.4%
WCI Shanghai to New York Container Rate WCIDSHNY Index 1,495 1,704 1,643 1,836 1,598 1,058
Δ% YoY 14.0% -3.6% 11.7% -12.9% -33.8%
WCI New York to Rotterdam Container Rate WCIDNYRO Index 961 998 832 665 482 252
Δ% YoY 3.9% -16.6% -20.1% -27.4% -47.7%
WCI Rotterdam to New York Container Rate WCIDRONY Index 1,220 1,254 1,062 1,062 1,093 921
Δ% YoY 2.8% -15.3% 0.0% 2.9% -15.7%
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Iron ore delivered to Quindao China – 62% Ferous Content - USD/tonne 
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Exhibit 11: Consolidated Balance Sheet  
Source: Annual Report 
 
 
















USD Millions 2015 2016 2015 2016
Intangible assets 1,922 3,620 Share capital 3,906 3,774
Property, plant and equipment 43,999 41,496 Reserves 31,181 27,484
35,087 31,258
Investments in joint ventures 1,723 1,749 Non-controlling interests 652 832
Investments in associated companies 889 855 Total equity 35,739 32,090
Other equity investments 860 796
Derivatives 17 14 Borrowings, non-current 11,408 13,320
Pensions, net assets 162 96
Loans receivable 483 127 Pensions and similar obligations 293 238
Other receivables 444 632 Provisions 4,539 3,573
Financial non-current assets, etc. 4,578 4,269 Derivatives 652 526
Deferred tax 280 605
Deferred tax 891 590 Other payables 6 33
Total non-current assets 51,390 49,975 Other non-current liabilities 5,770 4,975
Total non-current liabilities 17,178 18,295
Inventories 781 862
Borrowings, current 1,335 2,015
Trade receivables 3,476 3,814
Tax receivables 188 291 Provisions 1,172 1,255
Derivatives 84 161 Trade payables 5,015 4,901
Loans receivable 64 202 Tax payables 217 212
Other receivables 909 952 Derivatives 286 536
Prepayments 625 601 Other payables 1,204 1,348
Receivables, etc. 5,346 6,021 Deferred income 240 450
Other current liabilities 8,134 8,702
Securities 761 52 Liabilities associated with assets held for sale 22 16
Cash and bank balances 4,008 4,105 Total current liabilities 9,491 10,733
Assets held for sale 122 103 Total liabilities 26,669 29,028
Total current assets 11,018 11,143 Total equity and liabilities 62,408 61,118
Total assets 62,408 61,118
Equity attributable to Maersk
2017F 2018F 2019F
Sales 23,838 27,233 29,678
EBITDA 3,124 4,502 5,869
EBIT 1,073 2,154 2,493
Broker Consensus
NOPAT 1,255 2,213 3,791
Underlying Profit 1,148 2,192 2,644




































Date CUR_MKT_CAP Date CUR_MKT_CAP
31/01/2014 48,073 29/01/2016 27,389
28/02/2014 52,640 29/02/2016 28,014
31/03/2014 51,692 31/03/2016 27,886
30/04/2014 51,076 29/04/2016 29,784
28/05/2014 55,609 31/05/2016 27,331
30/06/2014 53,150 30/06/2016 26,470
31/07/2014 50,305 29/07/2016 27,650
29/08/2014 54,004 31/08/2016 30,384
30/09/2014 51,491 30/09/2016 29,828
31/10/2014 50,562 31/10/2016 31,139
28/11/2014 45,379 30/11/2016 27,003
30/12/2014 43,633 30/12/2016 32,364
30/01/2015 43,893 31/01/2017 33,890
27/02/2015 49,795 28/02/2017 33,122
31/03/2015 45,242 31/03/2017 34,147
30/04/2015 43,001 28/04/2017 35,273
29/05/2015 41,836 31/05/2017 38,695
30/06/2015 38,436 30/06/2017 40,735
31/07/2015 36,192 31/07/2017 44,333
31/08/2015 36,284 31/08/2017 41,711
30/09/2015 32,785 29/09/2017 38,824
30/10/2015 31,370 31/10/2017 39,254
30/11/2015 32,581 30/11/2017 36,441




























































COSCO SHIPPING HOLDINGS CO-H1919 HK Equity 13,067.4 6,667.4 2,640.4 13,883.4 10,516.0 (332.0) 1,313.6 (1,491.7) (774.8) 1.24x 0.94x 0.87x 0.81x - 12.43x 11.52x 8.86x 9.95x - 25.04x 17.43x 14.41x - - - - 0.94x
HAPAG-LLOYD AG HLAG GR Equity 6,546.3 2,734.3 5,331.1 9,771.7 8,560.5 647.5 1,751.1 (106.9) (108.0) 0.76x 0.56x 0.49x 0.47x 10.11x 5.54x 3.92x 3.43x 3.74x - 72.14x 7.03x 4.21x - 5.00x 2.76x 2.20x 0.67x
ORIENT OVERSEAS INTL LTD 316 HK Equity 4,695.2 2,594.7 4,519.3 8,698.2 5,297.7 217.7 575.4 (219.2) (117.4) 0.89x 0.76x 0.70x 0.65x 21.57x 7.71x 6.47x 5.44x 8.16x - 14.72x 9.57x 6.78x - - 6.80x 4.16x 0.54x
EVERGREEN MARINE CORP LTD2603 TT Equity 3,610.5 1,203.6 1,574.0 5,054.1 3,862.9 8.3 - (205.1) (49.3) 0.93x 0.73x 0.70x 0.65x 432.67x 7.64x 8.43x 6.74x - - 5.33x 6.92x 4.61x - 4.27x 3.16x - 0.71x
SITC INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS1308 HK Equity 1,644.2 1,591.7 880.0 1,297.8 1,215.8 179.9 349.8 122.8 124.7 1.35x 1.19x 1.10x 1.02x 9.14x 7.24x 6.48x 6.07x 4.70x 12.96x 9.34x 8.28x 7.16x 12.77x 11.52x 10.74x 8.69x 1.27x
YANG MING MARINE TRANSPORT2609 TT Equity 2,881.7 447.1 488.0 3,261.5 3,581.5 (268.6) 397.9 (462.8) (391.1) 0.80x 0.65x 0.64x 0.57x - 16.33x 12.77x 6.68x 7.24x - - 89.83x 2.69x - - - - 0.88x
NIPPON YUSEN KK 9101 JP Equity 10,031.5 3,271.2 6,877.1 16,392.1 18,943.4 1,269.8 - 152.0 224.6 0.53x 0.57x 0.53x 0.67x 7.90x 13.13x 9.89x 9.20x - 21.51x - 29.59x 15.56x 14.56x - - 15.38x 0.61x
MITSUI OSK LINES LTD 9104 JP Equity 11,163.6 2,434.7 4,832.3 15,783.0 14,274.1 792.8 - (1,421.0) 711.5 0.78x 0.84x 0.76x 1.05x 14.08x 16.06x 11.81x 9.86x - - 163.91x 19.25x 7.94x 3.42x - - 11.83x 0.71x
HYUNDAI MERCHANT MARINE011200 KS Equity 2,660.4 995.3 799.7 2,965.2 3,953.6 (555.4) 1,057.7 (418.8) (684.9) 0.67x 0.59x 0.57x 0.55x - - 86.01x 10.24x 2.52x - - - 75.08x - - - 75.08x 0.90x
KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA LTD9107 JP Equity 4,559.1 1,816.1 3,158.9 8,037.2 10,370.2 481.3 - (429.3) (606.7) 0.44x 0.50x 0.44x 0.68x 9.47x 45.38x 8.63x 7.99x - - - 21.34x 16.56x - - 13.39x 9.47x 0.57x
Average 0.84x 0.73x 0.68x 0.71x 72.13x 14.61x 16.59x 7.45x 6.05x 17.24x 48.41x 23.25x 15.50x 10.25x 6.93x 7.37x 18.12x 0.78x
Adjusted average 0.83x 0.71x 0.66x 0.70x 12.88x 11.50x 9.50x 7.61x 5.96x - 30.31x 16.07x 9.65x 12.77x 5.00x 6.90x 9.91x 0.75x
Median 0.79x 0.69x 0.67x 0.66x 10.11x 12.43x 9.26x 7.36x 5.97x 17.24x 19.88x 17.43x 7.55x 12.77x 5.00x 6.80x 9.47x 0.71x
Q1 0.70x 0.58x 0.54x 0.59x 9.31x 7.64x 6.97x 6.23x 3.98x 15.10x 10.68x 8.28x 5.15x 8.09x 4.63x 3.16x 6.42x 0.63x
Q3 0.92x 0.82x 0.74x 0.78x 17.83x 16.06x 11.74x 9.12x 7.93x 19.38x 60.37x 21.34x 15.27x 13.66x 8.26x 10.74x 13.61x 0.89x

















































HUTCHISON PORT HOLDINGS TR-UHPHT SP Equity 9,711.0 3,789.3 5,319.7 13,593.8 1,529.0 915.8 923.9 220.8 456.9 6.35x 6.47x 6.32x 6.18x 10.60x 11.43x 11.20x 10.93x 10.51x 17.17x 27.87x 26.84x 26.01x 8.29x 7.64x 7.07x 6.90x 0.71x
COSCO SHIPPING PORTS LTD1199 HK Equity 4,188.0 3,030.1 4,354.9 6,408.8 556.4 232.8 278.3 247.0 (53.4) 7.53x 7.02x 6.37x 5.88x 17.99x 10.50x 10.87x 11.29x 15.05x 12.27x 11.25x 11.42x 10.23x - 26.70x 36.80x 99.35x 0.65x
CHINA MERCHANTS PORT HOLDING144 HK Equity 9,949.3 6,515.3 8,500.0 12,695.4 1,027.5 699.3 731.7 707.8 441.6 9.68x 9.16x 8.53x 8.03x 14.23x 17.65x 16.52x 15.15x 13.60x 9.21x 9.78x 9.95x 8.90x 14.75x 36.35x 8.18x 7.42x 0.78x
PORT OF TAURANGA LTD POT NZ Equity 2,109.6 1,889.8 630.8 904.4 163.8 86.7 87.7 51.7 25.3 12.88x 11.15x 11.27x 10.64x 24.33x 20.78x 20.31x 19.10x 24.05x 36.57x 31.04x 30.91x 29.08x 74.65x 60.80x 27.47x 23.94x 2.33x
DP WORLD LTD DPW DU Equity 21,574.0 14,533.3 8,797.9 18,083.2 4,231.6 2,066.5 2,372.5 1,024.3 535.3 5.10x 4.63x 4.30x 4.05x 10.44x 8.96x 8.37x 7.87x 9.09x 14.19x 12.10x 11.12x 10.09x 27.15x 15.11x 10.21x 9.29x 1.19x
WESTPORTS HOLDINGS BHDWPRTS MK Equity 3,512.7 3,267.9 461.1 870.3 491.9 238.0 247.7 154.0 97.8 7.14x 6.67x 7.61x 7.03x 14.76x 15.56x 14.84x 13.32x 14.18x 21.22x 22.57x 22.91x 21.57x 33.41x 56.13x 21.92x 24.12x 4.04x
INTL CONTAINER TERM SVCS INCICT PM Equity 4,144.3 2,945.2 1,624.2 3,168.8 1,128.4 525.1 561.0 180.0 95.7 3.67x 3.35x 3.04x 2.83x 7.89x 7.15x 6.41x 5.90x 7.39x 16.36x 18.92x 14.11x 12.27x 30.78x 16.32x 9.55x 8.22x 1.31x
ADANI PORTS AND SPECIAL ECONADSEZ IN Equity 10,454.7 7,755.0 2,016.7 4,752.0 1,086.9 707.1 711.3 443.0 (64.5) 9.62x 8.10x 6.62x 5.95x 14.79x 12.39x 10.35x 9.17x 14.70x 17.51x 13.53x 14.02x 11.81x - 21.16x 19.30x 14.20x 2.20x
Average 7.75x 7.07x 6.76x 6.32x 14.38x 13.05x 12.36x 11.59x 13.57x 18.06x 18.38x 17.66x 16.25x 31.51x 30.02x 17.56x 24.18x 1.65x
Adjusted average 7.57x 7.01x 6.63x 6.19x 13.80x 12.75x 12.02x 11.29x 12.85x 16.45x 17.71x 16.74x 15.33x 26.52x 28.63x 16.10x 14.53x 1.42x
Median 7.33x 6.84x 6.50x 6.07x 14.49x 11.91x 11.03x 11.11x 13.89x 16.76x 16.23x 14.07x 12.04x 28.96x 23.93x 14.75x 11.74x 1.25x
Q1 6.04x 6.01x 5.82x 5.42x 10.56x 10.11x 9.85x 8.84x 10.16x 13.71x 11.88x 11.34x 10.20x 17.85x 16.01x 9.21x 8.02x 0.77x
Q3 9.65x 8.63x 8.07x 7.53x 16.39x 16.61x 15.68x 14.24x 14.87x 19.36x 20.75x 18.51x 16.92x 33.41x 46.24x 24.69x 24.03x 2.27x






















































CHEVRON CORP CVX US Equity 262,921 222,630 207,138 145,556 107,567 17,498 18,531 (497) (5,263) 2.44x 1.89x 1.76x 1.69x 15.03x 8.33x 7.24x 6.71x 14.19x - 28.55x 22.82x 19.70x - 35.35x 22.43x 21.02x 1.27x
STATOIL ASA STL NO Equity 75,461 59,406 71,004 35,072 45,688 10,209 13,161 (2,922) (3,157) 1.65x 1.26x 1.24x 1.17x 7.39x 3.42x 3.33x 3.06x 5.73x - 14.69x 15.51x 13.42x - 16.28x 18.45x 15.28x 1.06x
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC-A SHSRDSA LN Equity 300,974 225,763 281,836 186,646 233,591 27,360 29,556 4,575 (3,969) 1.29x 1.04x 0.98x 0.90x 11.00x 6.17x 5.69x 5.33x 10.18x 49.35x 14.70x 12.94x 11.63x - 12.15x 12.22x 12.57x 1.07x
BP PLC BP/ LN Equity 158,357 122,266 157,640 95,265 183,008 11,609 13,393 115 (6,010) 0.87x 0.70x 0.71x 0.62x 13.64x 5.95x 5.34x 4.92x 11.82x 1063.19x 21.27x 16.06x 13.70x - 29.47x 16.44x 12.89x 1.00x
OMV AG OMV AV Equity 20,422 11,555 19,598 9,159 21,318 5,477 6,371 (446) 947 0.96x 0.79x 0.75x 0.75x 3.73x 3.77x 3.89x 3.88x 3.21x - 6.36x 7.67x 7.62x 12.20x 5.03x 6.19x 6.11x 1.04x
TOTAL SA FP FP Equity 155,682 124,884 162,198 93,969 127,925 17,377 18,645 6,196 (1,585) 1.22x 1.19x 1.11x 1.05x 8.96x 7.08x 6.28x 5.81x 8.35x 20.16x 14.35x 13.25x 12.09x - 22.17x 18.12x 15.13x 0.96x
Average 1.40x 1.15x 1.09x 1.03x 9.96x 5.79x 5.29x 4.95x 8.91x 16.65x 14.71x 13.03x 20.08x 15.64x 13.83x 1.07x
Adjusted average 1.28x 1.07x 1.02x 0.97x 10.25x 5.74x 5.30x 4.98x 9.02x 16.25x 14.44x 12.71x 20.02x 16.31x 13.97x 1.04x
Median 1.25x 1.12x 1.04x 0.98x 9.98x 6.06x 5.51x 5.12x 9.27x 14.70x 14.38x 12.76x 19.23x 17.28x 14.01x 1.05x
Q1 1.02x 0.85x 0.80x 0.78x 7.78x 4.32x  4.14x 6.39x 14.44x 13.02x 11.75x 13.19x 13.28x 12.65x 1.01x


















































DEUTSCHE POST AG-REG DPW GR Equity 42,814.3 39,905.5 11,693.5 16,008.2 63,459.2 5,383.6 8,725.2 2,920.9 426.1 0.67x 0.60x 0.57x 0.55x 7.95x 6.90x 6.43x 5.99x 4.91x 13.66x 12.07x 11.26x 10.31x 93.65x 21.56x 18.29x 15.70x 2.67x
EXPEDITORS INTL WASH INCEXPD US Equity 8,553.4 9,525.2 1,844.6 1,874.3 6,098.0 717.0 779.3 430.8 469.8 1.40x 1.25x 1.18x 1.12x 11.93x 11.87x 11.00x 10.36x 10.98x 22.11x 21.86x 20.46x 19.34x 20.28x 22.41x 20.49x 19.97x 4.56x
DSV A/S DSV DC Equity 9,449.1 8,267.3 1,903.1 3,222.5 10,071.4 482.9 846.5 248.0 121.3 0.94x 0.80x 0.76x 0.73x 19.57x 10.76x 9.81x 9.16x 11.16x 33.34x 15.69x 13.75x 12.68x 68.15x 14.33x 13.20x 12.48x 2.93x
PANALPINA WELTTRANSPORT -REGPWTN SW Equity 2,594.1 2,965.7 597.7 561.1 5,276.2 133.7 - 55.1 90.8 0.49x 0.47x 0.45x 0.43x 19.40x 16.83x 13.23x 10.90x - 53.79x 39.02x 26.40x 20.02x 32.68x 41.01x 26.72x 21.76x 4.62x
KUEHNE + NAGEL INTL AG-REGKNIN SW Equity 15,011.9 15,819.0 2,123.5 2,154.0 16,779.9 1,127.1 1,686.6 729.1 625.5 0.89x 0.70x 0.68x 0.64x 13.32x 12.75x 11.57x 10.74x 8.90x 21.70x 20.91x 18.95x 17.31x 25.29x 24.28x 20.08x 18.35x 6.97x
Average 0.88x 0.76x 0.73x 0.70x 14.43x 11.82x 10.41x 9.43x 8.99x 28.92x 21.91x 18.16x 15.93x 48.01x 24.72x 19.76x 17.65x 4.35x
Adjusted average 0.84x 0.70x 0.67x 0.64x 14.88x 11.79x 10.79x 10.09x 9.94x 25.72x 19.49x 17.72x 16.44x 42.04x 22.75x 19.62x 18.01x 4.04x
Median 0.89x 0.70x 0.68x 0.64x 13.32x 11.87x 11.00x 10.36x 9.94x 22.11x 20.91x 18.95x 17.31x 32.68x 22.41x 20.08x 18.35x 4.56x
Q1 0.67x 0.60x 0.57x 0.55x 11.93x 10.76x 9.81x 9.16x 7.90x 21.70x 15.69x 13.75x 12.68x 25.29x 21.56x 18.29x 15.70x 2.93x
Q3 0.94x 0.80x 0.76x 0.73x 19.40x 12.75x 11.57x 10.74x 11.02x 33.34x 21.86x 20.46x 19.34x 68.15x 24.28x 20.49x 19.97x 4.62x

















































ROWAN COMPANIES PLC-A RDC US Equity 3,795.4 2,370.7 5,113.9 7,812.4 1,843.2 921.3 931.9 1,253.0 901.8 2.06x 3.03x 4.21x 4.42x 4.12x 7.72x 20.52x 31.44x 4.07x 7.57x - - - 4.28x 8.98x 30.17x 1147.94x 0.49x
DIAMOND OFFSHORE DRILLING DO US Equity 4,356.7 2,427.9 3,750.1 6,061.6 1,600.3 24.9 30.4 1,479.6 1,303.8 2.72x 2.94x 3.34x 3.53x 175.14x 7.52x 9.32x 10.78x 143.43x 7.39x - - - 3.03x 12.30x 41.33x - 0.72x
NOBLE CORP PLC NE US Equity 5,763.1 1,440.0 5,758.7 10,946.1 2,302.1 (150.9) - 1,180.3 1,094.0 2.50x 4.88x 5.27x 4.96x - 11.84x 14.03x 14.69x - - 20.34x 133.79x - - 6.90x 9.93x 18.95x 0.53x
TRANSOCEAN LTD RIG US Equity 11,182.3 5,739.3 15,802.0 24,272.0 4,161.0 2,025.0 2,070.0 2,813.4 2,581.9 2.69x 3.97x 4.33x 4.22x 5.52x 8.89x 11.07x 11.52x 5.40x - - - - 3.32x 5.32x 17.89x 680.84x 0.46x
ENSCO PLC-CL A ESV US Equity 5,622.2 2,945.6 8,250.6 13,522.8 2,776.4 1,374.6 1,407.2 1,849.2 1,912.0 2.03x 3.04x 2.94x 2.85x 4.09x 10.05x 12.14x 11.93x 4.00x 7.38x - - - 10.12x 10.16x 16.04x 29.28x 0.42x
Average 2.40x 3.57x 4.02x 4.00x 47.22x 9.20x 13.41x 16.07x 39.22x 7.45x 5.19x 8.73x 23.07x 0.52x
Adjusted average 2.42x 3.35x 3.96x 4.06x 4.82x 8.89x 12.41x 12.71x 4.74x 7.39x 3.80x 8.68x 21.37x 0.49x
Median 2.50x 3.04x 4.21x 4.22x 4.82x 8.89x 12.14x 11.93x 4.74x 7.39x 3.80x 8.98x 17.89x 0.49x
Q1 2.06x 3.03x 3.34x 3.53x 4.11x 7.72x 11.07x 11.52x 4.05x 7.39x 3.25x 6.90x 16.04x 0.46x
Q3 2.69x 3.97x 4.33x 4.42x 47.93x 10.05x 14.03x 14.69x 39.91x 7.48x 5.74x 10.16x 30.17x 0.53x






















































EURONAV NV EURN BB Equity 2,151.5 1,272.6 1,888.0 2,972.6 684.3 436.0 - 466.1 496.0 3.14x 4.62x 4.34x 3.72x 4.93x 9.33x 8.55x 6.55x - 6.24x - - 19.19x 13.32x 12.44x 15.84x 4.15x 0.72x
FRONTLINE LTD FRO US Equity 2,401.2 1,207.3 1,499.6 2,893.7 754.3 320.6 392.4 450.8 438.8 3.18x 5.33x 5.47x 3.87x 7.49x 11.60x 9.77x 6.91x 6.12x 10.32x - 484.32x 10.84x - - - 5.41x 0.83x
DHT HOLDINGS INC DHT US Equity 979.0 386.8 685.0 1,386.5 356.0 124.9 - 251.1 298.2 2.75x 3.90x 3.28x 2.54x 7.84x 6.39x 5.48x 3.95x - 41.77x 14.41x 10.41x 3.06x - - - 1.65x 0.71x
TEEKAY CORP TK US Equity 10,440.4 691.8 899.4 11,370.8 2,328.6 928.0 - 2,005.0 2,353.5 4.48x 5.21x 4.44x 4.31x 11.25x 11.25x 8.55x 7.66x - - - 200.52x 46.43x - - - - 0.92x
GENER8 MARITIME INC GNRT US Equity 1,795.8 371.7 1,437.4 2,956.2 404.6 203.5 205.4 308.0 292.7 4.44x 5.83x 6.14x 4.78x 8.83x 11.00x 10.49x 7.03x 8.74x 5.52x - - 4.31x - 1.03x 4.27x 2.46x 0.61x
NAVIOS MARITIME ACQUISITIONNNA US Equity 1,302.6 256.0 575.4 1,671.4 290.2 178.5 - 216.3 224.2 4.49x 6.02x 5.81x 4.94x 7.30x 12.41x 11.60x 8.74x - 4.07x - - 8.33x 2.75x 4.49x 2.29x 2.19x 0.78x
Average 3.75x 5.15x 4.91x 4.03x 7.94x 10.33x 9.07x 6.81x 13.58x 15.36x 5.99x 7.46x 3.17x 0.76x
Adjusted average 3.81x 5.25x 5.01x 4.17x 7.86x 10.80x 9.34x 7.04x 7.36x 10.67x 4.49x 4.27x 2.93x 0.76x
Median 3.81x 5.27x 4.95x 4.09x 7.67x 11.13x 9.16x 6.97x 6.24x 9.59x 4.49x 4.27x 2.46x 0.75x
Q1 3.15x 4.76x 4.36x 3.75x 7.35x 9.75x 8.55x 6.64x 5.52x 5.32x 2.76x 3.28x 2.19x 0.71x
Q3 4.47x 5.70x 5.73x 4.66x 8.58x 11.52x 10.31x 7.50x 10.32x 17.10x 8.47x 10.05x 4.15x 0.82x
